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Article 1

SYMPOSIUM

Onlookers Tell an Extraordinary
Entity What to Do
“RESTATEMENT OF…” SYMPOSIUM INTRODUCTION
Anita Bernstein†
INTRODUCTION
Differing from most law review symposia, “Restatement
Of . . . ” takes on more than a dozen fields of law—and butts into
someone else’s work. It has the temerity to give advice to a private
organization regarding the output it produces in furtherance of its
mission.1 Nobody inside the organization sought this advice until
I, acting at only my own behest,2 began e-mailing and phoning
academic experts to invite their participation.3 The theses of the
† Anita and Stuart Subotnick Professor of Law, Brooklyn Law School. My
thanks to the institutions that funded and enhanced this Symposium: Brooklyn Law
School, the Brooklyn Law Review, and the American Law Institute. Stephanie
Middleton, Leslie Griffin, Ron Krotoszynski, Dana Brakman Reiser, Michael Cahill,
and Lloyd Carew-Reid gave vital support to the project at an early stage—as did Lance
Liebman, who also lent ALI expertise to our planning and aided in the production of
this introduction. Thanks also to the Brooklyn Law Review editorial staff, especially
John Moore and Annie Cataldo, and to the Symposium authors for bringing their big
ideas to this collection.
1 A few other law review symposia that consider the prospect of new ALI
restatements do exist. See, e.g., Covey T. Oliver, Foreword, 25 VA. J. INT’L L. 1 (1984)
(assembling commentary about a new version of the RESTATEMENT OF FOREIGN
RELATIONS LAW); Gene Shreve, Introduction to Symposium: Preparing for the Next
Century—A New Restatement of Conflicts?, 75 IND. L.J. 399 (2000). This one breaks
new ground in that it examines the restateability of multiple fields.
2 In 1995 I joined the American Law Institute and published an essay about
its work, Anita Bernstein, Restatement Redux, 48 VAND. L. REV. 1663 (1995). I haven’t
been especially active in the production of new restatements, and I invited participants
to this Symposium before discussing the project with ALI personnel.
3 Their contributions follow in these pages. Three participants at the live
event in January—Ellen Bublick, Jeffrey Rachlinski, and Peter Strauss—were
unfortunately unable to join the published version of this Symposium.
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14 articles that follow present learned variations on “You
might . . . ,” “You should . . . ,” “You shouldn’t . . . ,” “You can’t,”
and even “You ought to consider restating something you might
not have even thought was a field.” Chutzpah, I admit.
The organization in question could well have said Who
asked you?, but it instead has reacted with the utmost
cooperation. As the afterword from outgoing director Lance
Liebman makes clear, the American Law Institute welcomed
what it could have written off as officious intermeddling.4 No
ordinary nonprofit, this Institute. Yet at the risk of appearing
ungrateful for the support that not only made this Symposium
possible but also caused it to flourish, I argue here that external
commentary like “Restatement Of . . . ” is entitled to a hearing by
the ALI. Entitled, because this extraordinary entity has
undertaken to listen.
Throughout the near century of its existence, the ALI has
been open to reassessing what it does, a stance that suggests
stakeholders can—and I argue here should—opine on the
possibility of both expansions and contractions in the
Restatement agenda. Our authors were charged to consider the
“restateability” of their fields of expertise and then recommend to
the ALI and their fellow stakeholders whatever they saw fit. As
gathered in this volume, their work product endorses new
undertakings, new abstentions from established ALI projects, and
particular responses to developments in varied corners of the law.
Each of the thoughtful articles in this volume has a place
in at least two groupings. The first grouping relates to the peer
audience of specialists to whom it speaks. By the authority of its
writer, each contribution joins the foundational scholarship of its
field, conversing with interlocutors who know its author as a
must-read authority. These varied literatures will thrive without
“Restatement Of . . . ” as a uniter: I leave them here.
The second grouping is this very issue of the Brooklyn Law
Review which, in the aggregate and through each individual
author, speaks to the American Law Institute, giving it advice
about what to do. Participants in the Symposium have responded
to a call; they join a dialogue that the American Law Institute has
invited in its founding and through its work.

4 See Gerhard Dannemann, Is Unjust Enrichment Law an Officious Intermeddler?,
92 B.U. L. REV. 991, 991 (2012) (describing the officious intermeddler as a “pest”).

2014]

I.

INTRODUCTION: RESTATEMENT OF . . .

383

THE CALL

It would be irresponsible of me to assert that this
Symposium responds to a tacit invitation from the American Law
Institute without also explaining what I understand the terms of
that offer to be. “You asked for it” can be an accurate assertion, but
it has a worrisome provenance.5 The asserter ought to say who was
asked, what was asked for, and what the asker owes in response.
Let me dispatch the last point first: The ALI need do
nothing in reaction to the ideas aired in the Symposium. However
interesting and pertinent they may be, they are not entitled to be
heeded. The first two points—who is invited to weigh in and what
the ALI has invited—require more elaboration.
A.

Who Is Invited

The ALI has overtly welcomed input from its
membership. This group, capped at 3,000 persons (with life, ex
officio, and honorary members of the Institute excluded), is
“expected to take an active part in the Institute’s activities.”6
Helping to guide the work of the Institute through the expression
of opinions is close to obligatory; individuals may fulfill their
membership obligation by alternative means, but their ideas
about what to do form an important base of their participation.
Most of the authors in this Symposium, as members of the ALI,
are delivering on an expectation fixed before “Restatement
Of . . . ” came together.
The cohort of onlookers who may tell this extraordinary
entity what to do extends beyond the membership roster. We
can infer as much with reference to the Institute’s mission and
operations. The ALI continually reexamines its membership
procedures, ever attentive to the challenge of recruiting newer
voices and perspectives.7 Lest anyone think that this practice is
recent or even faddish, I note that Learned Hand himself,

5 Cf. The “Failure to Protect” Working Group, Charging Battered Mothers
with “Failure to Protect”: Still Blaming the Victim, 27 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 849 (2000).
6 Membership
Overview,
A.L.I.,
http://ali.org/index.cfm?fuseaction=
membership.membership (last visited Oct. 15, 2013).
7 In a recent newsletter the Institute mused over the prospect of radically
overhauling its recruitment of new members. Changes Coming to ALI Membership
Process, A.L.I. REP. 3 (Spring/Summer 2013), available at http://www.ali.org/_news/
reporter/spring-summer-2013/spring-summer-2013.pdf.
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writing about the future of the Institute in the middle of the
twentieth century, shared in it.8
Has anyone and everyone been invited to weigh in? Not
quite. The ALI is for better or worse an elite entity, expecting
participants in the dialogues it establishes to possess “the
highest qualifications.”9 Over the years it has caused hosts of
persons to feel excluded.10 It also unabashedly makes demands.
Consistent with the ALI tradition of filtering, when I extended
invitations to this Symposium I recalled how the Institute expects
willingness to share in its mission, a criterion that though
expansive is consistent with a filtering heritage. And so I asked
the highly qualified invitees to generate new “scholarly work to
clarify, modernize, and otherwise improve the law.”11 Scholars
were not required to be members of the ALI to join “Restatement
Of . . . ” and thereby make suggestions to the ALI about what it
should do, but they were expected to share in an agenda of
improvement. As you will see, they lived up to this expectation.
There was another demand. In addition to possessing the
highest qualifications and sharing in an agenda to clarify,
modernize, and improve the law, persons entitled to tell the
Institute what to do must also, in the ALI’s words, leave their
clients at the door.12 By this phrase the Institute—along with me,
8 Writing about the Council, in effect the directors of the ALI as a
corporation, Hand wrote:

[W]e think that there should be an enlargement of its members, with a
consequent infusion of fresh ideas and point of view. We recommend the
addition of ten more members with the distinct understanding that they shall
come from the forty to fifty age group rather than in the higher brackets
where most of the present membership is.
AM. LAW INST., REPORT OF SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON FUTURE PROGRAM 315 (submitted to
the ALI Council, Mar. 18, 1947), [hereinafter HAND REPORT].
9 ALI Overview, A.L.I., http://ali.org/index.cfm?fuseaction=about.overview
(last visited Oct. 15, 2013).
10 Kristen David Adams, Blaming the Mirror: The Restatements and the
Common Law, 40 IND. L. REV. 205, 208-10 (2007) (cataloguing “criticisms [that] often
center on the membership of the Institute, the scope and goals of Institute projects, the
perception that the Restatements have not incorporated the knowledge of other
disciplines . . . and the view that the Restatements represent antiquated Formalist
thought that is not useful to modern lawyers”).
11 ALI Overview, supra note 9.
12 Quoting The ALI Reporter, one distinguished member of the Institute took
that stance:
To maintain the Institute’s reputation for thoughtful, disinterested analysis
of legal issues, members are expected to leave client interests at the door.
Members should speak and vote on the basis of their personal and
professional convictions and experience without regard to client interests or
self-interest. It is improper under Institute principles for a member to
represent a client in Institute proceedings. If, in the consideration of Institute
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in this Symposium—has said that advice for ALI action must
originate in a disinterested motive to improve the law, with
speakers expressing opinions for themselves rather than as
anyone’s agents.13
The articles published here are all written by full-time
academics rather than client-focused partisans, and so this
point about neutrality may seem tangential to these proceedings.
But this Symposium is hardly the first occasion of onlookers
telling this extraordinary entity what to do. As the ALI enters its
next century, it will not be the last. Would-be advisers ought to
know who has received the ALI call. It’s you, provided that you
possess knowledge about the subject on which you opine and you
have left any private or partisan agenda at the door.
B.

What Is Invited

Here the ALI welcome grows wide and plenary. This
breadth was in place from the start. Adopted on February 23,
1923, the Institute’s corporate charter expresses a commitment
to “the clarification and simplification of the law and its better
adaptation to social needs, to secure the better administration of
justice, and to encourage and carry on scholarly and scientific
legal work.”14 One of its leaders during this era, the contracts
scholar Arthur Corbin, may have had authority to bind the ALI
when he welcomed critical assessments of its work product: “The
productions of the Institute should receive constant criticism,
both destructive and constructive,” Corbin wrote a few years
after the founding, “from within the membership of the
Institute and from without.”15

work, a member’s statements can be properly assessed only if the client
interests of the member or the member’s firm are known, the member should
make appropriate disclosure, but need not identify clients.
Alex Elson, The Case for an In-Depth Study of the American Law Institute, 23 LAW &
SOC. INQUIRY 625, 636 (1998) (citation omitted). Compare Elizabeth Laposata et al.,
Tobacco Industry Influence on the American Law Institute’s Restatements of Torts and
Implications for Its Conflict of Interest Policies, 98 IOWA L. REV. 1 (2012), with Roberta
Cooper Ramo & Lance Liebman, The ALI’s Response to the Center for Tobacco Control
Research & Education, 98 IOWA L. REV. BULL. 1 (2013) (debating the application of this
conflict of interest policy).
13 For a worrisome articulation of this point, see Elson, supra note 12, at 634
(“I have been told by several members of the [ALI] council that in recent years lobbying
pressure upon them has been intense. What impact, if any, does such pressure have?”).
14 Certificate of Incorporation, A.L.I., http://www.ali.org/index.cfm?fuseaction=
about.charter (last visited Oct. 15, 2013).
15 Arthur L. Corbin, The Restatement of the Common Law by the American
Law Institute, 15 IOWA L. REV. 19, 29 (1929).
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This broad platform has given ALI leaders the space to
deliver a variety of responses to the needs of their time.
Elsewhere I have argued that “clarification . . . of the law” back in
the pre-computer scrivener founding era imposed mechanistic
obligations on ALI volunteers.16 Today, with decisional law
produced and stored in reliable electronic form, the work of
clarification permits more debate and more choices.
The roster of Restatements shows a policy of expansion.
In its first round of work, completed in 1944, the ALI restated
common law fields: agency, conflict of laws, contracts, judgments,
property, restitution, security, torts, and trusts.17 The First
Restatements of these doctrines created a new form for American
law—neither code nor treatise nor monograph.18 Though divided
from the start on the basic question of whether to summarize
or change what judges had held in decisional law,19 each of
these new documents was, in hindsight, skillfully crafted to
gain influence in a conservative sector. Restatements leveraged
the elite pedigrees of their writers to join the American legal
establishment with little delay.
The ALI could have rested on these laurels, reading its
1923 charter to identify an agenda completed when Restatement
(First) was done. It had clarified and simplified the law wherever
American judges had disagreed about the substantive common
law rights and entitlements of private litigants.20 Surely “better
adaptation to social needs,” “the better administration of justice,”
and “scholarly and scientific legal work” would emerge from
this base of publications.21 Enough, no?
No, said the Institute in 1947, in a remarkable report
authored by Learned Hand as chairman of a seven-member
Special Committee on Future Programs. With its Restatements
published and gaining strength, the ALI formed this committee in
1946 to consider what was next for the organization. Hand began
the report by quoting himself: “There must be, in the words of the
Chairman, several dishes simmering on the back of the stove so
16 Bernstein, supra note 2, at 1665 (citing N.E.H. Hull, Restatement and
Reform: A New Perspective on the Origins of the American Law Institute, 8 LAW & HIST.
REV. 55, 81 (1990)).
17 Jordan Steele, Univ. Pa., First Restatement of the Law Records,
http://dla.library.upenn.edu/dla/ead/ead.pdf?id=EAD_upenn_biddle_USPULPULALI04
001 (last updated Apr. 28, 2011).
18 Bernstein, supra note 2, at 1668.
19 Id. at 1667.
20 Dan Tarlock, Why There Should Be No Restatement of Environmental Law,
79 BROOK. L. REV 663, 665 (2014) (making this point about substance not procedure).
21 See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
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that when the presently used one is empty there is something
to cook and serve for a next course.”22 The Hand Report
endorsed many ideas for new projects: a variety of undertakings
in business associations, a criminal law code, continued work in
juvenile justice,23 a critical reexamination of common law rules as
found in different fields, an income tax code (on which more anon
from Lawrence Zelenak),24 possible contributions to a United
Nations-sponsored code of international law, recommendations
for the reform of patent law, more restating of property (more
anon on that one too),25 and attention to continuing legal
education. Curiously, the one prospect that Hand and his
colleagues abjured was new Restatements. This hesitation
aside, the ALI announced an ever-onward initiative in 1947, a
stance to which it adheres.
ALI director Lance Liebman, in his afterword to this
Symposium, touches on a few highlights of the twenty-first
century Institute, of which a move into the transnational has
been especially noteworthy.26 Liebman observes that the ALI has
never defined the term restatement.27 Like him, I read this
omission of a definition as inviting multiple views of what might
be restated. The diverse contributions to this Symposium do not
begin to exhaust what could be on the Restatement horizon.
One caveat on the question of what is invited: In my
opinion, the Institute’s attention to “improvement”28 implicitly
22 HAND REPORT, supra note 8, at 299. Hand’s comparison of ALI work to what
simmers on a kitchen stove is welcome to this reader. See Anita Bernstein, Restatement
(Third) of Torts: General Principles and the Prescription of Masculine Order, 54 VAND. L.
REV. 1367, 1392 n.122 (2001) (praising what a journalist called an “analogy overhaul” away
from “retreats and victories, blows delivered and knockouts scored, bulls’-eyes, pilings on,
Hail-Mary passes and hat tricks,” and proposing “few fewer penalty boxes and fumbles,
saturation bombings, shots across the bow and hits below the belt—wouldn’t this be a
pleasure for everyone?”(quoting Geneva Overholser, Rise of Women Could Change Sound of
Power, ATLANTA J.-CONST., Nov. 27, 2000, at A11)).
23 Susan Frelich Appleton’s contribution to this Symposium may be read as
responsive to this suggestion. Susan Frelich Appleton, Restating Childhood, 79 BROOK.
L. REV. 525 (2014).
24 Lawrence Zelenak, The Almost-Restatement of Income Tax of 1954: When
Tax Giants Roamed the Earth, 79 BROOK. L. REV. 709 (2014).
25 Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, Why Restate the Bundle? The
Disintegration of the Restatement of Property, 79 BROOK. L. REV. 681 (2014).
26 Lance Liebman, Law Reform Agenda as ALI Approaches Its Centennial:
“Restatement Of…” Symposium Conclusion, 79 BROOK. L. REV. 821, 821-23 (2014).
27 Id. at 822. Even the most basic points are open. V. William Scarpato, “Is” v.
“Ought,” or How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love the Restatement, 85 TEMP. L.
REV. 413, 447 n.331 (2013) (assembling citations on the perennial question of whether
ALI restatements ought to say what the law is or what it should be).
28 See Part I: Report of the Committee on the Establishment of a Permanent
Organization for the Improvement of the Law Proposing the Establishment of an
American Law Institute, 1 A.L.I. PROC. 1, 2 (1923).
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states a demand that those who respond to its call engage with
American legal institutions. Theory and ideology may pervade the
responses that onlookers make, but in the end those who speak to
the ALI must include action items, something concrete to do.29 A
focus on usefulness is likely part of why we law professors seek to
join the organization and look for a project when we sign up. We
who publish law review articles have other venues for our less
purposeful work. The Institute, aware that sometimes we want
to make a difference in the world, invites us to bring analyses
and inquiry to discrete projects that we can propose.
II.

THE RESPONSE

In response to the American Law Institute call, scholars in
this Symposium have written what might be termed position
papers that take an array of normative stances. This Part groups
them into five categories.
A.

Widening the List of Topics

This first cohort of writers chose to name areas of law
that arguably qualify for new Restatements of their own.
Readers who expect this section of the Symposium to feature
self-interested special pleading—Pick me and mine! We deserve
more attention!—are in for a happy surprise. Scholars whose
work appears here make detailed, citation-filled, substantive
cases for the inclusion of three fields.
Leading off is Marci Hamilton, noted for both
scholarship and advocacy in a number of domains including her
focus in recent years on redress for, and prevention of, the sexual
abuse of children. In The Time Has Come for a Restatement of
Child Sex Abuse,30 Hamilton announces an imperative for an
emerging field. Like most of what the ALI undertakes to restate,
the doctrinal source material that Hamilton studies is covered
largely in common law, but Hamilton also canvasses statutes on
point, such as state-level mandatory reporting laws and crimes
codified in Title 18 of the United States Code, before moving to
rules of evidence and the First Amendment. Like the ALI’s
29 See, e.g., A.L.I., Annual Report 2012–2103 at 19 (announcing the Young
Scholars Medal, a biennial ALI prize for “early-career law professors whose work is
relevant to the real world”). I may be wrong on this point about concreteness but, as
one of our contributors notes, I have stated it insistently. Mae Kuykendall, Restatement
of Place, 79 BROOK. L. REV. 757, 761 (2014).
30 Marci A. Hamilton, The Time Has Come for a Restatement of Child Sex
Abuse, 79 BROOK. L. REV. 397 (2014).
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Restatement of the Law Governing Lawyers, which makes
reference to the law of agency, torts, contracts, and evidence,
Hamilton’s Restatement of Child Sex Abuse would bring together
a variety of doctrinal inputs in a pertinent new context.31
Similar to Hamilton in this respect, David Orentlicher
partakes of a range of sources in advocating for A Restatement of
Health Care Law.32 Unique biographical credentials inform this
work: as a medical doctor and former state legislator as well as a
legal scholar, Orentlicher speaks with authority about treatment
decisions, informed consent, and state-based insurance regulation.
Also like Hamilton, Orentlicher includes constitutional doctrines
and federal statutory law in the restatement mix for which he
advocates. For any reader who might think that health care law is
too eclectic to restate, Orentlicher has a pertinent rejoinder: Courts
already treat it as a field unto itself. What Orentlicher calls “health
care exceptionalism” has generated a panoply of judicial
prohibitions, exceptions, immunities, and other ad hoc responses
that fit together poorly.33 A health care Restatement would give
reformers a chance to examine a jumble, learning “the ways in
which health care is both different from, and similar to, other
sectors of the economy.”34
The last paper of this section continues the theme of
expansion. Copyright scholar Ann Bartow proposes a
Restatement of her field of expertise, an area dominated by one
federal statute, the Copyright Act.35 One might have thought that
the traditional Restatement attention to state rather than federal
law and common law rather than statutes would disqualify
copyright from restateability. But as other contributions to this
Symposium observe, federal statutory law has long lain in the
sights of restaters,36 and as Bartow shows, copyright is plenty
“complicated,”37 disputed, and refashioned in the courts.
Moreover, as Bartow argues, the place that Restatement of
Copyright could occupy is now held by a for-profit treatise
manifesting influences that, as we have seen above, the American
31 See
Restatement
of
the
Law
Governing
Lawyers,
A.L.I.,
http://www.ali.org/ali_old/a252.htm (last visited Oct. 15, 2013) (noting that “the special
context of lawyering” unites “traditional areas”).
32 David Orentlicher, A Restatement of Health Care Law, 79 BROOK. L. REV.
435 (2014).
33 Id. at 447-48
34 Id. at 448.
35 Ann Bartow, A Restatement of Copyright Law as More Independent and
Stable Treatise, 79 BROOK. L. REV. 457 (2014).
36 See Dan Tarlock, Why There Should Be No Restatement of Environmental
Law, 79 BROOK. L. REV. 663 (2014); Zelenak, supra note 24, at 709.
37 Bartow, supra note 35, at 457.
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Law Institute eschews.38 A Restatement of Copyright Law as More
Independent and Stable Treatise states a claim for the ALI that is
consistent with, but also expansive of, the Institute’s mission.
B.

Projects Underway

Writers in this group elaborate on fields of law that the
ALI has already undertaken to restate. In different ways, their
three articles explore what it means to restate a new field of law:
the first of them provides an alternative perspective on a
Principles-in-progress led by two other scholars, while the other
two reflect on the priorities and concerns they brought to the ALI
in advocating for the restateability of the field they know well.
In the first of these contributions, Ronald Krotoszynski,
Jr. complements the anticipated Principles of Privacy now under
construction by co-reporters Paul Schwartz and Daniel Solove.39
As Krotoszynski notes, the ALI version of a privacy restatement
focuses on data protection, a narrower understanding of privacy
than the one Krotoszynski has advanced in numerous
monographs and law review articles,40 and yet even the
Schwartz and Solove project “faces serious difficulties.”41 The
wide reach of this issue in American law might commend the
application of a “pervasive method”42 to the problem of privacy,
wherein the ALI would answer questions piecemeal as they
arise in separate Restatements. But to Krotoszynski this reaction
amounts to denial that will not succeed; the concept has settled
into our national consciousness. “If we cannot slay the privacy
hydra, then we must learn to live with the privacy hydra.”43 A
Prolegomenon to Any Future Restatement of Privacy thus presents
the subject in full breadth, including an observation that the ALI
has led American law reform on the subject of privacy at least

See supra Part I.A. See generally Bartow, supra note 35.
Ronald Krotoszynski, Jr., A Prolegomenon to Any Future Restatement of
Privacy, 79 BROOK. L. REV. 505 (2014).
40 See RONALD J. KROTOSZYNSKI, JR., PRIVACY REVISITED: A GLOBAL
PERSPECTIVE ON THE “RIGHT TO BE LET ALONE” (forthcoming 2014); Ronald J.
Krotoszynski, Jr., The Polysemy of Privacy, 88 IND. L.J. 881, 882 (2013) (expounding on
what the word means); Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., A Comparative Perspective on the
First Amendment: Free Speech, Militant Democracy, and the Primacy of Dignity as a
Preferred Constitutional Value in Germany, 78 TUL. L. REV. 1549 (2004) (endorsing a
comparative approach).
41 Krotoszynski, supra note 39, at 507.
42 See Deborah L. Rhode, Ethics by the Pervasive Method, 42 J. LEGAL EDUC.
31, 32 (1992) (announcing a new pedagogy).
43 Krotoszynski, supra note 39, at 509.
38
39
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since 1955, when the Model Penal Code boldly proposed to stay
out of consenting adults’ sex lives.44
The other two projects underway are described by ALI
participants who speak for themselves, but also advert to
restatement plans they have advanced inside the Institute.
In the first of these two articles, Susan Frelich Appleton
expounds on Restating Childhood.45 American law regulates and
controls childhood, Appleton explains, yet “even beyond
predictable divergences in the conclusions reached or balances
struck across the range of legal contexts, the underlying
premises about children that yield these responses lack
consistency.”46 Appleton is inspired by two past ALI works: the
Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution, for its prescient
embrace of emerging insights, and the Model Penal Code, for
reformist ambitions that resemble what the law of children
needs. As a member of the ALI Council as well as a prominent
scholar of family law, Appleton is ideally positioned to guide
the Institute through the task of restating childhood; her
article is as authoritative on family-law substance as it is on
ALI procedure.
The second project underway in the ALI, on election
law, occupies comparable breadth. Steven Huefner and Edward
Foley observe that election law is “the ‘meta-law’ of
representative democracy.”47 Much depends on its rules and
processes, heavily revised and expanded at both the state and
federal level in the 14 years since Bush v. Gore. These rules
and processes tangle the kind of attention the ALI could give
them—and yet, as Huefner and Foley suggest in their title,
reconciliation and reform are hard to achieve in a field of law so
dominated by politics. Focused (as am I) on achieving results
on the ground, Huefner and Foley find two areas of election law
especially ready for their efforts: principles for resolving
disputed elections, and analyses of how to vote when one is
away from one’s geographic precinct.48 These specifics give
their Principles of Election Law a base from which Huefner and
Foley can consider the jurisprudence of neutrality,
partisanship, and federalism.

Id. at 505.
Appleton, supra note 23, at 527.
46 Id.
47 Steven F. Huefner & Edward B. Foley, The Judicialization of Politics: The
Challenge of the ALI Principles of Election Law Project, 79 BROOK. L. REV. 551, 553 (2014).
48 Id. at 558-60.
44
45
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Restatements between the Lines

This third group of responses to the call takes a
different approach from the earlier two. Instead of advocating
for a new ALI-sponsored text in their field of expertise, they
consider where and whether this subject is found in existing
Restatements. They find Restatements between the lines.
Religion scholar Ian Bartrum opens this group of
contributions by asking and answering the question of how the
ALI can helpfully engage with religion in American law.49
Bartrum starts by noting the prominence of religion in the
contemporary United States. For this purpose he reads religion
as religious liberty: a “constitutional bedrock,” he says, around
which “the common law river sweeps.”50 Bartrum locates
religious liberty in existing doctrinal Restatements, identifies
potential conflicts within these instances, and commends to the
ALI a short list of religious-liberty themes and issues to
examine in future work.
Whereas Bartrum works in the “micro” particulars of
Restatement blackletter, the lawyer-economist Keith Hylton
considers restating as a macro-activity engaged in by a reporter
appointed by the ALI, comparable to common law lawmaking.51
Every Restatement, Hylton suggests, manifests the incentives
and goals of the individual whom the ALI vests with the power
to draft the document. The Economics of the Restatement and of
the Common Law is the only one of these 14 articles that
conceives of restating as the output of one person who labors
alone. Hylton qualifies this generalization: “of course, the ALI
has to approve the Reporter’s work, which constrains the
Reporter’s freedom.”52 Yet these checks, Hylton argues, do not
shelter Restatements from the impulse to publish what their
drafters want to say, and so they come to contain eccentric
blackletter inconsistent with the better-checked common law.53
Surveying examples from the various Restatements of Torts,
Hylton educes a meta-restatement of law and economics, a
record of how individuals satisfied their preferences at the
expense of doctrinal correctness.

Ian Bartrum, Religion and the Restatements, 79 BROOK. L. REV. 579 (2014).
Id. at 580.
51 Keith N. Hylton, The Economics of the Restatement and of the Common
Law, 79 BROOK. L. REV. 595 (2014).
52 Id. at 603.
53 Id. at 603-04.
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A third way to talk about Restatements between the
lines is to contrast a hypothetical freestanding new text,
advocated above under “A Wider List of Topics” and “Projects
Underway,” with an interstitial take on restating. In The
Restatement of Gay(?),54 Courtney Joslin and Lawrence Levine
weigh the relative merits of each approach and conclude that
what LGBT law should receive from the ALI is the latter rather
than the former. Joslin and Levine show that a separate volume
about the law pertaining to lesbian, gay, bisexual, and
transgender persons risks marginalizing and isolating topics
that matter to this vibrant minority. Instead, they argue, the
ALI ought to choose “LGBT incorporation.”55 Building on their
expertise in family law and torts respectively, Joslin and Levine
give examples of where existing ALI Restatements could
modernize American law through expanded LGBT attention.
D.

Unrestateable?

Contributions in this group answer the ALI call with a
response that the field would be challenging, at a minimum, to
restate. Their answer is not an unequivocal No. Instead, they
describe complications that might arise from such attempts to
restate the law governing their areas of expertise.
This cohort of articles starts with Why There Should Be
No Restatement of Environmental Law by A. Dan Tarlock who,
before the live event, proffered the useful adjective
“unrestateable” to describe a domain of law that he has helped
to form.56 Writing partly in reaction to the recent suggestion
that the ALI consider studying two subfields of environmental
law,57 Tarlock concludes that “environmental law needs to be
reimagined not restated.” He makes a graceful case against a
new Restatement. Acknowledging that the brushoff “Romans
didn’t recognize the subject” no longer can toss a Restatement
project from the contemporary ALI agenda,58 Tarlock moves to
what really precludes this new document: Environmental law,
he explains, is positive law—not common law, where restating
fares best. Legislators had to promulgate it because common law
54 Courtney G. Joslin & Lawrence C. Levine, The Restatement of Gay(?), 79
BROOK. L. REV. 621 (2014).
55 Id. at 630.
56 Tarlock, supra note 36, at 663.
57 The subfields are environmental impact analysis and environmental
enforcement. See id.
58 See id. at 664-66.
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antecedents like nuisance do not adequately impede the human
tendency to “use . . . air, soil and water as waste sinks.”59
Moreover, as Tarlock shows, environmental law does not contain
enough substantive general-application content to restate.
A related yet distinct difficulty vexes the Restatement of
Property, a compendium that the ALI has been working on
continually for 75 years. If property, like Tarlock’s environmental
law, is unrestateable, then 17 published volumes that purport to
restate the law of property call for an explanation. Our
Symposium contains a definitive account from the persons best
qualified to explain this failure, Thomas Merrill and Henry
Smith. Restatements (First), (Second), and (Third) of Property,
according to Merrill and Smith, have had little influence on the
courts, manifest several contradictions,60 and are silent on
fundamentals like adverse possession, real estate transfers,
recording acts, groundwater and mineral rights, eminent
domain, and intellectual property. Seeking to explain this
failure, Merrill and Smith travel back to the First Restatement,
where they find powerful influence in the works of Wesley
Newcomb Hohfeld. Property to Hohfeld was “bundle of rights,”
or, in Merrill and Smith’s paraphrase, “an ever-mutating
institution” that denies an internal architecture and thus
cannot be restated. Hohfeld has been dead for almost a
hundred years but his conception retains appeal among
property scholars who disagree on other points.61 Why Restate
the Bundle? The Disintegration of the Restatement of Property
tells the ALI that it can have the bundle or a Restatement but
it can’t have both.
A more affectionate history in this “Unrestateable” corner
of our Symposium details the work of the ALI on federal income
tax, which Lawrence Zelenak says was prepared “when tax giants
roamed the earth.”62 Zelenak, a tax giant himself, argues that we
have no Restatement of the Law of Federal Income Taxation not
because the project is too ambitious, but because the challenge of
preparing it, at least as envisioned by the ALI in 1948, “was not
ambitious enough.”63 In 1954 the ALI published not a
Restatement but a draft federal income tax statute. Consistent
Id. at 667.
Merrill & Smith, supra note 25 at 681 (“[S]ignificant portions of the third
Restatement consist of repudiating what was done in the first and second
Restatements, which can hardly inspire confidence.” (footnote omitted)).
61 Id. at 696-98.
62 Zelenak, supra note 24, at 709.
63 Id.
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with what Learned Hand and his special committee had
advocated, this two-volume document did not try to set tax rates;64
it also stayed out of tax procedure and specialized provisions.65
But it covered almost everything that Congress could want for its
revision of the old 1939 Internal Revenue Code. When the 1954
Code came out, it showed the handiwork of the ALI “giants.” One
ALI idea that did not appear in the 1954 Code, non-recognition of
gain and loss for property transferred in connection with divorce,
was simply ahead of its time; it became federal law three decades
later.66 Current federal income tax law is now too complex for the
ALI to restate, Zelenak concludes, but discrete smaller projects
remain available for its intervention.
The last article in this cluster returns to the “Why
There Should Be No Restatement” theme with which it began,
but with a different slant on rejection. Statutory interpretation
scholar Lawrence Solan urges the ALI to eschew restating
statutory interpretation out of a concern broached above by
Huefner and Foley: politics.67 Recall that Huefner and Foley
spoke about “the judicialization of politics” as a background
condition behind restating election law;68 to moderate this fact
on the ground, they have started to look for relatively neutral
principles in a partisan realm. Solan worries that a
Restatement of statutory interpretation would have all the
politics but not enough of the candor that makes an ALI
Principles of Election Law so promising to Huefner and Foley.
Identifying another difficulty, Solan, who holds a doctorate in
linguistics, notes the futility of trying to apply “ordinary
meaning” as a rubric to know what words in a statute mean.69
In order to be restateable, Solan concludes, a field needs its
share of easy cases; but statutory interpretation, for better or
worse, remains “largely about hard cases.”70
E.

Coda

At the end of this volume Mae Kuykendall, known
primarily for her work on corporate governance but also a
pioneering scholar in other fields, proposes a new Restatement
HAND REPORT, supra note 8, at 306.
Zelenak, supra note 24, at 710.
66 Id. at 722.
67 Lawrence
M. Solan, Is It Time for a Restatement of Statutory
Interpretation?, 79 BROOK. L. REV. 733, 742 (2014).
68 Huefner & Foley, supra note 47, at 559.
69 Solan, supra note 67, at 753.
70 Id. at 755.
64
65
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of Place.71 Because this article advocates inclusion of a new
field in the Restatement gallery, it has a good potential home
in the first part of this book. Yet the meditative, almost elegiac,
approach to restating that Kuykendall takes also brackets the
entire Symposium.
Suggesting that the ALI prepare a Restatement of Place,
Kuykendall sets out “to provide demonstrative examples of the
presence of place in the construction of law; to suggest how a
rigorous analysis of its presence across dimensions of law might
proceed; and to suggest the manner in which principles might be
shaped to guide law-making or the application of common law.”72
Restatement of Place defines place, distinguishes it from space
and territory, and finds it ubiquitous as a legal classification.
Place is restateable not as a “set of standard doctrines affecting
an activity,” Kuykendall argues, but “the unstated premise of
much of law. Places organize the operative parts of a legal
question; locutions take forms of place metaphor, or they overtly
use measurements of space, to define duties and rights.”73
The Symposium thus begins and ends with a theme
present both in the ALI’s call and the contributors’ response: the
imperative to widen. Its final article urges the Institute to
undertake a restatement of one subject for the sake of obtaining
“a deeper account” of how it fits within “legal reasoning, the
assignment of rights, and the understanding of facts.”74 The
other articles published here—along with the ALI itself, from
its founding era through this moment—pursue the same goal.

71
72
73
74

Kuykendall, supra note 29, at 757.
Id. at 763.
Id. at 785.
Id. at 817.

